Security Assessment Report: Missing Rate Limiting in ==== API

**Project:** BasedHardware/===

**Assessment Focus:** Rate Limiting and Brute-force Mitigation

**Date:** ===========

**Assessed by:** Independent Security Research

Executive Summary

The ======= project does not appear to implement rate limiting or brute-force protection mechanisms on its backend API. This leaves the service vulnerable to automated abuse, such as credential stuffing, enumeration attacks, denial of service, and excessive usage from untrusted clients.

Detailed Findings

1. No Rate Limiting on Public or Auth-Required Endpoints

Inspection of the API backend and its routing (using frameworks like FastAPI) does not show evidence of:
– IP-based request throttling.
– Token or UID-based request limits.
– Global or per-route rate thresholds.

Endpoints such as:

POST /v1/user/verify
POST /v1/fact
POST /v1/user/login

appear to accept repeated requests from the same source without delay or rejection.

Example Exploits:

– Login brute-force: An attacker could try thousands of email/password combinations via the login route.
– UID probing: Endpoints that use a UID as input could be targeted with high-frequency UID guessing attempts.
– Fact Injection: High-volume POST /v1/fact requests could flood the system with junk data.

2. Lack of Captcha, Lockouts, or Progressive Delays

The system lacks user interaction challenges (like CAPTCHAs) or progressive account lockouts after multiple failed attempts. This increases the risk of:
– Credential Stuffing Attacks using known email/password dumps.
– Enumeration of valid user IDs based on differing error responses.
– Denial of Service through request floods.

Risk Summary

Threat Type	Description	Severity
Brute-force login	No protections prevent automated credential guessing	High
UID enumeration	Automated requests may reveal valid users	High
Service degradation	Unchecked traffic could slow or crash backend components	Medium

Recommendations

Short-Term Fixes

– Implement per-IP rate limits using middleware (e.g., slowapi for FastAPI).
– Throttle sensitive endpoints like login, verification, and data submission.

Long-Term Hardening

1. Enable Brute-Force Mitigation
– Add exponential backoff or lockouts after repeated failures.
– Monitor logs for unusual access patterns.

2. Use CAPTCHA or Device Fingerprinting
– Enforce CAPTCHA during login or verification processes.
– Prevent automation via headless browsers or curl scripts.

3. Centralized Rate Limiting Layer
– Deploy an API gateway (e.g., NGINX with limit_req) or WAF in front of the backend to enforce traffic shaping.

Additional Notes

– No mention of rate limiting exists in ===== codebase or documentation.
– Tools like fail2ban, crowdsec, or cloud-layer protections (e.g., Cloudflare) can be introduced to monitor and block abusive patterns.

Testing Methodology

– Inspected FastAPI route definitions for throttling logic.
– Checked for use of common rate limiting libraries (slowapi, limits, etc.).
– Simulated multiple identical POST requests to key endpoints using curl and ab (ApacheBench).

Conclusion

Omi’s backend lacks protections against automated abuse. This omission could allow attackers to exploit the system through brute-force login attempts, UID enumeration, and backend flooding. Immediate implementation of rate limiting and brute-force protection is strongly recommended.